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U.S. JURY REFORM: THE ACTIVE JURY AND THE ADVERSARIAL 
IDEAL 
VALERIE P. HANS* 
In many countries, lay people participate as decision makers in legal cases. 
Some countries include their citizens in the justice system as lay judges1 or 
jurors, 2 who assess cases independently. The legal systems of other nations 
combine lay and law-trained judges who decide cases together in mixed 
tribunals.3 Whatever the approach, a number of justifications for lay 
participation in the law have been advanced. Advocates claim many salutary 
effects: It improves decision making, reduces the effect of biased or corrupt 
judges, keeps the legal system in touch with community values, represents the 
diversity of citizen perspectives and experiences, and enhances the legal 
system’s overall legitimacy.4 
The International Conference on Lay Participation in the Criminal Trial in 
the 21st Century provided useful contrasts among different methods of 
incorporating lay voices into criminal justice systems worldwide.  Systems 
with inquisitorial methods are more likely to employ mixed courts, whereas 
adversarial systems more often use juries.  Research presented at the 
 
* Professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice, University of Delaware.  Author’s Note.  An 
earlier version of this Article was presented at the international conference, Lay Participation in 
the Criminal Trial in the 21st Century, Siracusa, May 29, 1999.  I would like to thank Steve 
Thaman for organizing a spectacular and intellectually exciting conference and for his comments 
on an earlier draft of this Article.  Research on the impact of jury trial discussions was funded by 
State Justice Institute grant SJI-96-12A-B-181 to the National Center for State Courts.  Opinions 
in the Article do not reflect official positions of the State Justice Institute or the National Center 
for State Courts.  Correspondence may be addressed to: Valerie Hans, Department of Sociology 
and Criminal Justice, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, USA. Telephone: 302-831-
8231; Fax: 302-831-2607; email: vhans@udel.edu. Web site: http://www.udel.edu/soc/vhans. 
 1. Shari S. Diamond, Revising Images of Public Punitiveness: Sentencing by Lay and 
Professional Magistrates, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 191 (1990); Michael Zander, England and 
Wales Report, 72 INT’L. REV. PENAL L. 121, 122 (2001). 
 2. WORLD JURY SYSTEMS (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000); Stephen C. Thaman, Europe’s New 
Jury Systems: The Cases of Spain and Russia, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261 (1999); Neil 
Vidmar, Foreword, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1999). 
 3. SANJA K. IVKOVICH, LAY PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: THE CASE OF CROATIA 
(1999). 
 4. VALERIE  P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986); IVKOVICH, supra note 
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Conference showed that lay judges are often marginalized when they decide 
cases together with professional judges.5  This occurs despite the fact that in 
many mixed tribunals, lay judges outnumber professional judges and 
theoretically could dominate the decisions.  The mingling of lay and law-
trained judges within a single decision-making body operates to reverse the 
direction of the dominance.  The minority of professional judges trumps the 
majority of lay judges by virtue of the professional judges’ greater experience 
and legal expertise.  This limits the impact of lay perspectives on legal 
outcomes in mixed tribunals. 
By contrast, the jury system insulates lay decisionmakers from judges 
during the deliberation process, and provides greater potential for lay input to 
determine legal outcomes.  However, the jury has been the subject of sharp 
attack on grounds of its supposed incompetence and bias.6  Some critics argue 
that the complexity of today’s criminal and civil disputes is high and that a 
group of randomly chosen citizens is unlikely to fully understand the 
evidentiary and legal issues in such cases.  Other opponents of jury trial claim 
that racist and other biases regularly infect jury verdicts.  Further criticism 
comes from business leaders who argue that the irrationality and 
unpredictability of civil jury verdicts and awards undermine business and 
industry.7 
These and other criticisms of the American jury trial have stimulated a 
widespread movement for jury reform.  Reforms have included changing jury 
selection procedures so that a broader and more representative group serves on 
juries, and changing trial practice to promote the jury’s ability to comprehend 
the evidence.8 
 
 5. IVKOVIĆ, supra note 3, at 522-25; Stefan Machura, Interaction Between Lay Assessors 
and Professional Judges in German Mixed Courts, 72 INT’L REV. PENAL L. 451 (2001). 
 6. WILLIAM L. DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE 1-6 (2002); Peter Duff & Mark 
Findlay, The Politics of Jury Reform, in THE JURY UNDER ATTACK 209 (Mark Findlay & Peter 
Duff eds.,1988). 
 7. For summaries of critiques, compare, STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL 
JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995), with Valerie P. Hans & Andrea J. Appel, The Jury 
on Trial, in A HANDBOOK OF JURY RESEARCH § 3-1 (Walter F. Abbott & John Batt eds., 1999). 
 8. A number of excellent articles and books summarize the case for jury reform.  The best 
compendium of innovations is found in JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS (G. Thomas Munsterman et 
al. eds., 1997).  See also G. Thomas Munsterman & Paula L. Hannaford, Reshaping the Bedrock 
of Democracy: American Jury Reform During the Last 30 Years, 36 JUDGES’ J.  5, 5-7 (1997). 
Several recent issues of law related journals have also focused on jury reform.  See, e.g., Phoebe 
C. Ellsworth, Jury Reform at the End of the Century: Real Agreement, Real Changes, 32 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 213 (1999) (introduction to a special issue of the journal on jury reform); 
Nancy J. King, Jury Research and Reform: An Introduction, 79 JUDICATURE 214 (1996) 
(introduction to a special issue of the journal on jury research and reform).  An interesting 
perspective on jury reform is provided by Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects 
of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441 (1997). 
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This Article focuses on jury reforms that encourage a more active approach 
in jury decision-making.  An intriguing aspect of contemporary U.S. jury 
reform is that several reforms appear to move the jury away from strict 
adversarial practice and toward adoption of some features of the inquisitorial 
approach.9  The Article draws on the comparative information provided by the 
Conference to speculate about how contemporary jury reforms may modify the 
adversarial ideal of the neutral, passive jury.  The Article focuses on two 
specific reforms that provide the strongest challenge to the traditional model of 
the passive jury, allowing jurors to ask questions of witnesses and permitting 
jurors to discuss evidence during the trial. 
The Adversary Ideal 
In the formal model of the adversary system, adversary attorneys present 
their facts to a neutral, passive decisionmaker.  Rules of evidence determine 
the content and process of the factual presentation.  The decisionmaker absorbs 
the full presentations of both sides; applies the relevant legal rules, and waits 
until the end of the trial to make a judgment.  The passivity of the 
decisionmaker is emphasized, as evidence scholar Mirjan DamaÓka observes: 
“While evidence is being adduced, [jurors] sit silent, cast—one might say—
into the role of potted courtroom plants.”10  The adversary approach may be 
differentiated from an inquisitorial system, such as that employed in many 
European countries, in which decisionmakers are permitted a more active role 
in the development of evidence.  Under the French inquisitorial system, for 
example, the examining magistrate may order tests, call parties to testify, and 
question witnesses. 
A central assumption of the adversary system is that the passivity of the 
decisionmaker is essential in promoting his or her neutrality: 
The adversary system relies on a neutral and passive decision maker [who] is 
expected to refrain from making any judgments until the conclusion of the 
contest and is prohibited from becoming actively involved in the gathering of 
evidence . . . . Adversary theory suggests that if the decisionmaker strays from 
the passive role, he runs a serious risk of prematurely committing himself to 
one or another version of the facts and of failing to appreciate the value of all 
of the evidence.11 
Requiring the neutrality of the factfinder and limiting the development of 
evidence in a case to the adversaries are thus central characteristics of the 
 
 9. Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of 
Adversarial Processes, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 355 (1998). 
 10. MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 90 (1997). 
 11. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 2-3 
(1984). 
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adversary approach.  These features are said to encourage the view that the 
decision-making process has been fair and just.12  Empirical studies of relative 
preferences for adversary and non-adversary methods find that adversary 
approaches are often judged to be fairer than other dispute resolution 
methods.13  Thus, the theoretical benefits of decisionmaker passivity include 
greater neutrality and the avoidance of prejudgment on the part of the 
decisionmaker and enhanced perception of justice on the part of the litigants to 
a dispute. 
The Adversarial Model in Practice 
In practice, the adversary system’s idealized features are not completely 
realized.  Regular interactions among members of the courtroom workgroup 
encourage cooperation and information sharing among judge, prosecutor, and 
defense attorney.14  Legal opinions pertaining to the judicial role within an 
adversary system conclude that a judge is not required to sit there like a 
doorstop.  In the Watergate burglary trial of the 1970s, made famous because it 
eventually led to Richard Nixon’s resignation as President of the United States, 
the presiding Judge John Sirica became convinced that the Watergate burglars 
were covering up to protect others and that the adversarial questioning was 
insufficient.  During the trial, he himself asked a substantial number of 
questions of the witnesses involved in the offense.  The Watergate burglars 
were convicted by the jury, and one of the grounds of the appeal was that 
Judge Sirica had overstepped the bounds of his role as judge by questioning 
witnesses extensively.  The appellate court upheld the conviction, however, 
observing that even extensive questioning was consistent with the judicial role 
with an adversary system.15 
Empirical research on the jury also suggests that jury decision-making is a 
more active process than presumed by the idealized adversary model.  The 
assumptions that jurors are initially neutral and remain so until the end of the 
trial, and that they passively receive evidence presented by the adversaries, are 
not borne out.  Research in social cognition and decision-making indicates that 
jurors, like the rest of us, take an active approach to their decision-making 
 
 12. Id. at 3; E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE (1988); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). 
 13. LIND & TYLER, supra note 12, at 7-40, (especially Chapter 2). 
 14. JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1991). 
 15. JOHN J. SIRICA, TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE BREAK-IN, THE TAPES, THE 
CONSPIRATORS, THE PARDON (1979). 
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task.16  The story model of jury decision-making, proposed and confirmed by 
Pennington and Hastie,17 posits that jurors come to trial with preconceptions 
and knowledge that help to shape their interpretation of evidence.  From the 
very beginning of the trial, jurors process information and evidence, weaving 
evidence into a compelling narrative or “story.”18  Jurors tend to fill in 
evidentiary gaps and resolve inconsistencies in line with the overall story they 
are creating.  Indeed, they may reject contradictory information.  This 
explanation-based approach to decision-making occurs throughout the trial.19 
At least some jurors consult with their fellow jurors or outsiders during the 
trial, casting further doubt on the presumption of juror passivity within an 
adversary system.  How frequently this occurs is not known.  Loftus and Leber 
estimated that about ten percent of jurors engaged in prohibited discussions.20  
A study of Arizona civil jurors found that a significant minority of jurors 
admitted talking about the case to one another or to friends and family during 
the trial.21 
The Active Jury as the Basis for Reform 
In an influential law review article, B. Michael Dann, then an Arizona state 
trial judge, drew on the empirical research on jury decision-making to call for 
trial practice reforms that took advantage of the active decision-making 
 
 16. SUSAN T. FISKE  & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d ed. 1991); Reid Hastie, 
The Role of “Stories” in Civil Jury Judgments, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 227 (1999) [hereinafter 
Hastie, The Role of Stories]; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex 
Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986) [hereinafter Pennington & 
Hastie, Evidence Evaluation]; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests 
of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992) 
[hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence]; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, 
The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR 
DECISION MAKING 192 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, The Story 
Model]. 
 17. Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence, supra note 16; Pennington & Hastie, The 
Story Model; supra note 16; Hastie, The Role of Stories, supra note 16. 
 18. Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence, supra note 16; Pennington & Hastie, The 
Story Model; supra note 16; Hastie, The Role of Stories, supra note 16. 
 19. Hastie, The Role of Stories, supra note 16. 
 20. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Douglas Leber, Do Jurors Talk? 22 TRIAL 59 (1986). 
 21. Paula L. Hannaford, Valerie P. Hans & G. Thomas Munsterman, Permitting Jury 
Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 359 (2000) 
[hereinafter Hannaford, Hans, and Munsterman, Permitting Jury Discussions]; Valerie P. Hans, 
Paula L. Hannaford & G. Thomas Munsterman, The Arizona Jury Reform Permitting Civil Jury 
Trial Discussions: The Views of Trial Participants, Judges, and Jurors, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
349 (1999) [hereinafter Hans, Hannaford, & Munsterman, The Arizona Jury Reform]. 
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approach of jurors.22  He pointed out that current adversary trial practice 
presumes and reinforces juror passivity.  Jurors are not permitted to ask 
questions and in some jurisdictions they are not even allowed to take notes.  
They are instructed to refrain from speaking with one another and with 
outsiders for the duration of the trial.  They are instructed to hold off reaching 
a conclusion until the final deliberations. 
Judge Dann pointed out the critical problem.  If jurors begin developing 
narratives of the evidence and verdict preferences near the beginning of the 
trial, then these trial procedures could undermine the jury’s ability to make 
accurate and fair decisions.  Delaying the presentation of critical information 
until the end of the trial, or withholding opportunities to raise questions or to 
discuss the case with other jurors are counterproductive.  Dann recommended 
making the courtroom more like a classroom, adopting techniques that have 
been shown in educational contexts to improve the ability to comprehend and 
apply complex information.23 
Dann was an early and eloquent voice for jury reforms encouraging a more 
active approach to decision-making.  However, he has now been joined by 
many scholars and policymakers who favor a participatory approach.24  
Surveying jury reform efforts in many states, one can observe that the active 
juror model has caught on.25 
Question Asking by Jurors: The Ultimate Departure from Passivity 
One of the most controversial reforms advocated by a number of scholars 
and judges is to allow jurors to ask questions of witnesses.  A major contrast 
 
 22. B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights:” Creating Educated and 
Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229 (1993).  Judge Dann is now retired. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury Decisionmaking, in 
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 341 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); H. Lee Sarokin 
& G. Thomas Munsterman, Recent Innovations in Civil Jury Trial Procedures, in VERDICT: 
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 378 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
 25. Some of the specific state reports include the following: COUNCIL FOR COURT 
EXCELLENCE, JURIES FOR THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND: PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE JURY 
SYSTEMS IN WASHINGTON D.C. at http://www.courtexcellence.org/publications/ 
reports.shtml#dec2000 (1998); DELAWARE SUPERIOR COURT: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
THE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF JURIES, at http://www.dsba.org/tfrep.htm (1998); JURORS: THE 
POWER OF TWELVE: REPORT OF THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON MORE 
EFFECTIVE USE OF JURIES (1994); THE JURY PROJECT, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK (Mar. 31, 1994); WITH RESPECT TO THE JURY: A PROPOSAL FOR JURY 
REFORM: REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT USE 
OF JURIES IN COLORADO at http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/committees/juryref/juryref.htm 
(1997).  For summaries of state reforms see G. Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State 
Jury Reform Efforts, 79 JUDICATURE 216 (1996). 
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between adversarial and inquisitorial systems is the extent to which the 
decisionmaker is involved in the development of evidence.  In the adversary 
system, that job is exclusively that of the adversaries, while in the inquisitorial 
system, decisionmakers take a more active approach.  Allowing jurors to ask 
questions of witnesses thus has the potential to shift adversary trial procedure 
toward its inquisitorial cousin. 
The recommended implementation of juror questions in United States 
courtrooms, however, includes a number of protections for the parties.  For 
instance, the American Judicature Society crafted procedures for juror 
question-asking that include tight judicial control over juror question-asking 
and full opportunity for each of the parties to make motions to exclude 
questions.26  Nevertheless, some commentators point out that it undermines the 
exclusive right of the adversaries to determine what evidence should be 
presented to the decisionmaker at the trial, and has the potential to disrupt the 
trial.27  It is noteworthy that in surveys with judges, attorneys, and jurors, 
attorneys are the most negative about the reform.28 
Empirical studies of juror question-asking have examined the impact of 
allowing jurors to ask questions.  The most extensive research has been 
conducted by jury researchers Larry Heuer and Steven D. Penrod.  In a series 
of articles, they describe two field experiments they conducted on juror 
question-asking.29  One study was conducted in the state of Wisconsin, while 
the other drew on a national sample of judges and trials.  Both included 
random assignment of trials. In half the trials, jurors were allowed to ask 
questions during the trial, while in the other half they were not permitted to ask 
questions.  Judges who agreed to take part received instructions about which 
procedure to implement in their next jury trial.  Jurors in trials that had been 
randomly assigned to allow juror questions were instructed by the judge that 
they had the opportunity to ask questions of witnesses.  They were further told: 
“Because that is the primary responsibility of the counsel, you are not 
 
 26. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, TOWARD MORE ACTIVE JURIES: TAKING NOTES AND 
ASKING QUESTIONS (1991). 
 27. For a discussion of criticisms of juror questions see William W. Schwarzer, Reforming 
Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 139-42 (1990). 
 28. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials Through Note 
Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256 (1996) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, 
Increasing Juror Participation]. 
 29. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation in Trials: A Field 
Experiment with Juror Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231 (1988) 
[hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, A Field Experiment]; Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Juror 
Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials: A National Field Experiment, 18 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 121 (1994) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking]; Larry Heuer & Steven D. 
Penrod, Some Suggestions for the Critical Appraisal of a More Active Jury, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 
226 (1990) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, Some Suggestions]. 
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encouraged to ask large numbers of questions.”30  Jurors wrote their questions 
down on a piece of paper, which was conveyed to the judge, who then ruled on 
the admissibility of each question after input by counsel. 
Heuer and Penrod’s research found that jurors allowed to ask questions did 
so, but at a modest rate.  In the national survey, for example, jurors asked at 
least one question in fifty-one of the seventy-one trials in which they were 
permitted to do so, but the median number of questions per trial was two.  On 
average, jurors asked about one question for every two hours of case 
presentation.31  Lawyers objected to approximately a quarter of the questions, 
and the majority of their objections (approximately eighty percent) were 
sustained. 
It’s interesting to examine what kinds of issues jurors raise in their 
questions. In a separate study of Arizona civil juries that were allowed to ask 
questions, Nicole Mott coded the types and topics of their questions.32  Jurors 
most frequently requested clarification of specific evidence that a witness 
presented during testimony.33 A substantial number of questions were asked of 
expert witnesses. Jurors most often asked expert witnesses about the evidence 
relevant to the case before them, but they also inquired about common 
practices, typical situations, or the impact of preexisting conditions. Jurors 
occasionally asked plaintiffs or defendants to explain their actions. They 
inquired about financial matters, such as growth rates of money or insurance 
coverage. Infrequently, they asked judges to further explain legal rules.34 
Jurors asked a greater number of questions in complex cases.35 
There is no evidence that the more active, question-asking jury departs 
from neutrality along with its departure from passivity.  In Heuer and Penrod’s 
national study, being allowed to ask questions did not affect jury verdicts, the 
rate of judicial agreement with jury verdicts, or the attorneys’ and judge’s 
satisfaction with the jury verdict.36  One interesting effect is that jurors who 
were allowed to ask questions reported greater satisfaction with the attorneys’ 
performance in the case.37 
Based on their studies, Heuer and Penrod concluded that question asking 
did not appear to generate harmful consequences.38  No detectable effects on 
 
 30. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 28, at 258. 
 31. Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking, supra note 29, at 141. 
 32. Nicole L. Mott, How Civil Juries Cope with Complexity: Defining the Issues 119-20 
(2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Delaware) (on file with author). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 127-29. 
 36. Id. at 121. 
 37. Id. at 147. 
 38. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 28. 
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jury comprehension, either positive or negative, were observed.  Heuer and 
Penrod noted that their methodology was not well suited to assess 
improvements in jury comprehension.  However, jurors themselves were very 
positive about being able to ask questions, saying they felt better informed and 
felt they had sufficient information to reach a sound verdict.  In Heuer and 
Penrod’s research, the judges and attorneys who had experience with juror 
questions reported more positive evaluations of this trial innovation, compared 
to judges and attorneys who had not experienced it first-hand.  Judges with no 
experience were close to neutral about the technique, but employing the 
technique in a trial led them to become favorably disposed toward juror 
question-asking. 
As for the attorneys surveyed by Heuer and Penrod, they went from being 
moderately negative to more neutral.39  The fact that they remained cautious 
about the reform is not surprising.  In a traditional adversary trial the attorneys 
control the questioning of witnesses themselves, subject only to judicial 
control.  When jurors are permitted to ask questions, attorneys must cede some 
of the control to them as well. 
Nevertheless, the advocacy of the American Judicature Society and state-
based jury reform efforts have led to an expansion of the once rare use of juror 
questions.  Jurors have been permitted to ask questions in an increasing 
number of jurisdictions.40 
Jury Discussions of Evidence During the Trial 
A second reform that challenges the adversary ideal of the neutral, passive 
jury is the reform, now permitted in only a few jurisdictions, of allowing jurors 
to discuss the evidence with one another during the presentation of the case.  
The traditional approach is for jurors to be instructed that they must not talk 
about the case with one another until the final deliberations, after all the 
evidence, arguments, and legal instructions have been presented. 
Judge Dann chaired an influential committee, the Arizona Supreme Court 
Committee on More Effective Use of Juries, that evaluated the Arizona jury 
system and recommended many changes to promote a more active approach to 
the decision-making task of juries.  The recommendations included notetaking, 
question asking, and allowing jurors to discuss the evidence amongst 
themselves during the trial.  The report cited a number of positive effects of 
allowing jurors to discuss evidence: 
a. Juror comprehension will be enhanced, given the benefits of interactive 
communication; 
 
 39. Id. at 261. 
 40. JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 8. 
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b. Questions can be asked and impressions shared on a timely basis rather 
than held until deliberations or forgotten; 
c. A juror’s tentative or preliminary judgments might surface and be 
tested by the group’s knowledge; and 
d. Divisive “fugitive” conversations and cliques might be reduced, given 
the opportunities for “venting” in the presence of the entire jury in the 
jury room.41 
The rationale for permitting jurors to discuss evidence relies on the active juror 
model.  If biases develop during the presentation of evidence that shape how 
later evidence is considered, then timely deliberation about evidence during 
trial could serve to correct individual errors and biases.42 
The state of Arizona became the first jurisdiction to expressly permit jurors 
to discuss evidence during the trial.43  At this time, Arizona jurors can do so 
only in civil trials; in criminal trials jurors must still wait until the final 
deliberations to discuss the case with one another.  In civil cases, the trial judge 
instructs the jury at the beginning of the trial that jurors may discuss evidence 
during the trial, at recesses and breaks, only if all of them are present in the 
jury room.  They are warned not to discuss who should win the lawsuit and 
admonished not to make up their minds until all of the evidence, arguments, 
and legal instructions are concluded.44 
The State of Arizona is a real-world laboratory to assess the effects of the 
active juror model.  The National Center for State Courts, with funding from 
the State Justice Institute, recently concluded a field experiment in Arizona 
that was designed to test the impact of allowing jurors to discuss evidence 
during the trial.45  Following an order from the Arizona Supreme Court 
permitting random assignment for experimental evaluation purposes, civil 
cases were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions.  In the 
first set of cases, jurors received the traditional admonition that they must not 
discuss the evidence amongst themselves before the final deliberations.  In a 
 
 41. JURORS: THE POWER OF TWELVE, supra note 25, at 98. 
 42. Dann, supra note 22; Natasha K. LaKamp, Comment, Deliberating Juror 
Predeliberation Discussions: Should California Follow the Arizona Model? 45 UCLA L. REV. 
845 (1998). 
 43. Ariz. Sup. Ct. Orders Nos. R-94-0031 & R-92-0004 (1995).  See also Ariz. R. Civ. P.  
39(f).  In other jurisdictions, some judges have allowed jurors to discuss evidence during the trial 
in an experimental fashion with the consent of the parties.  See Elizabeth Amon, Shaking Up 
Juries, State by State, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 14, 2000, at A14.  For example, last year, Washington 
D.C. Superior Court Judge Gregory Mize permitted jurors in approximately twenty-five trials to 
hold midtrial discussions.  Id. 
 44. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 39(f). 
 45. Hannaford, Hans & Munsterman, Permitting Jury Discussions, supra note 21; Hans, 
Hannaford & Munsterman, The Arizona Jury Reform, supra note 21.  I served as a consultant to 
that project. 
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second set of cases, jurors were given an instruction that followed the current 
Arizona rule that they could discuss the evidence amongst themselves if all 
were present in the jury room.  These jurors received the admonition that they 
were to refrain from talking about what the verdict should be and from making 
up their minds before the end of the trial.46  Questionnaires were distributed to 
judges, jurors, attorneys, and litigants, asking about a range of issues relevant 
to the hypothesized benefits and drawbacks of permitting jurors to discuss 
evidence.  Judicial and attorney evaluations of the soundness of the verdicts 
were also solicited to assess whether allowing trial discussions led to verdicts 
that were questioned more frequently. 
The jurors who participated in trial discussions were very positive about 
the reform.  A total of eighty-three percent of the jurors whose juries had been 
permitted to discuss the evidence during trial and had engaged in at least one 
discussion said they felt comfortable discussing the evidence during trial.  The 
majority reported that they found the trial discussions accurate and helpful, and 
that all jurors’ points of view were thoroughly considered during the 
discussions.47  A minority acknowledged that they felt somewhat concerned 
about inappropriately influencing or being influenced by the opinions of the 
other jurors by engaging in trial discussions.  In fact, thirty percent of the juries 
who were instructed that they could participate in trial discussions reported that 
their jury had engaged in no discussions.48  These trials tended to be shorter, 
however, and a shorter trial provides fewer opportunities for discussion.49 
Judges were very enthusiastic about the reform.  Three-quarters of the trial 
judges stated that they supported the reform, believing that trial discussions 
improve juror understanding of the evidence.50  Less than a third believed that 
trial discussions “encourage jurors to make up their minds early on, before all 
the evidence and the law is presented.”51  Litigants and attorneys, however, 
were split in their views, with only about half of each group favoring trial 
discussions.52  The adversary parties showed much greater concern about the 
possibility that trial discussions would encourage jurors to make up their minds 
prematurely.53  However, whether a litigant was a plaintiff or a defendant, and 
 
 46. For a detailed description of the methodology of the study, see Hannaford, Hans & 
Munsterman, Permitting Jury Instructions, supra note 21. 
 47. Hans, Hannaford & Munsterman, The Arizona Jury Reform, supra note 21, at 377. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Hannaford, Hans & Munsterman, Permitting Jury Instructions, supra note 21. 
 50. Hans, Hannaford & Munsterman, The Arizona Jury Reform, supra note 21, at 376. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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whether an attorney had represented the plaintiff and the defendant, made no 
difference in support for the reform.54 
An analysis of jurors’ reports about when they started leaning to one side 
or another and when they made up their minds about who should win, showed 
no overall effects of trial discussions in these reports.55  There were also no 
overall differences in primacy or recency effects, which might have been 
expected if jurors who discussed the case began to make up their minds early 
on.  Judicial agreement with the jury verdicts was similar in trials where juries 
had or had not been permitted to participate in trial discussions.  There was no 
apparent impact on jury comprehension, either positive or negative, as was 
found in the Heuer and Penrod study on question asking. 
Allowing jurors to discuss evidence during trial did have some effects.56  
Jurors who were allowed to discuss the evidence reported that they were more 
certain about their preferences at the start of jury deliberations.  This makes 
sense in that these jurors had an opportunity to discuss and contrast their views 
of the evidence with other jurors prior to the final deliberations.  There was 
also some evidence that permitting trial discussions encouraged more vigorous 
debate, in that juries who could do so reported more conflict and more 
difficulty reaching unanimity.  This finding is at odds with psychologist Robert 
MacCoun’s prediction that trial discussions might create more shared biases 
among the members of a jury.57  More shared biases should lead to easier 
agreement rather than greater conflict.  A second test of the effect of jury trial 
discussions has recently been completed. Analyses of the results of this second 
study should help to clarify some of the effects of the reform.58 
Conclusion: Jury Reform within the Adversary System 
 
 54. Id. at 368-69. 
 55. Hannaford, Hans & Munsterman, Permitting Jury Discussions, supra note 21.  For a 
fuller analysis of jurors’ self-reports about when they began leaning toward one side, changed 
their minds, and made up their minds, see Paula L. Hannaford, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott, 
& G. Thomas Munsterman, The Timing of Opinion Formation by Jurors in Civil Cases: An 
Empirical Examination, 67 TENN. L. REV. 627 (2000). 
 56. Hannaford, Hans & Munsterman, Permitting Jury Instructions, supra note 21.  A 
methodological problem complicated the assessment of some of the effects of the reform.  
Although the cases were randomly assigned to trials in which jury discussions were or were not 
permitted, by chance the cases with discussions were identified by the trial judge as somewhat 
stronger cases for the plaintiff, and also by chance the cases without discussions were more 
complex.  Id. 
 57. ROBERT MACCOUN, IMPROVING JURY COMPREHENSION IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL 
TRIALS, (RAND Institute for Civil Justice ed., 1995). 
 58. Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1857 (2001); Valerie P. Hans, Inside the Black Box: Comment on Diamond and 
Vidmar, 87 VA. L. REV. 1917 (2001). 
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The two reforms discussed in this Article represent only a fraction of the 
proposed jury reforms that are sweeping the United States today.  We are in the 
midst of a remarkable period in which states appear quite ready to experiment 
with and modify some of the traditional features of the adversary jury trial.  
The reforms are trumpeted as methods for improving the soundness of the jury 
trial, for transforming the jury into a decision-making body that can cope with 
the increasingly complex evidence of contemporary trials.  By taking 
advantage of the active decision-making tendencies of jurors, they hold the 
promise of improving the comprehension of evidence and the quality of the 
legal outcome. 
Is there a cost? Professor Sanders observes that many jury reforms weaken 
the adversaries’ control over the case, whether it is by increasing the judge’s 
role (through case management and admissibility decisions) or by increasing 
the jury’s active participation (through notetaking and question asking).59  He 
concludes that “more active judges and more active juries inevitably lead to 
less power in the hands of the parties and their attorneys.  These responses 
represent a weakening of adversarialism that is more fundamental.”60  Of 
course, it is a diminution of adversarialism that many Americans might well 
favor, since there is widespread belief that the justice system is excessively 
adversarial.61 
This Article raises the collateral possibility that widespread adoption of 
jury reforms such as question asking and trial discussions may bring the U.S. 
adversary system more in line with Europe’s inquisitorial approach.  A jury 
that discusses evidence as the trial goes on and that is able to question 
witnesses itself begins to resemble the decisionmaker in an inquisitorial 
system.  Is there a danger that jury reforms could operate to undermine citizen 
input as empirical evidence shows is the case in mixed tribunals? 
On the one hand, the opportunity to discuss evidence during trial preserves 
the jury’s independence from the judge.  In fact, it could operate to reinforce 
its independence as a decision-making body.  But other jury reforms such as 
jury questioning provide more opportunities for the judge to influence jurors 
through answering their questions or responding to their doubts.  As we 
continue to evaluate the impact of jury reforms, assessing their case-specific 
effects on decision-making competence and juror bias, we should bear in mind 
the broader function of the jury to represent the community’s perspectives and 
 
 59. Sanders, supra note 9. 
 60. Id. at 387. 
 61. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: 
A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY at http://www.ncsc.dni.us/ptc/results/nms4.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 
2002); Valerie P. Hans & Jonathan D. Casper, Trial by Jury and the Legitimacy of the Courts, in 
THE CRIME CONUNDRUM: ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 93 (Lawrence M. Friedman & George 
Fisher eds., 1997). 
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values.  Our assessment of jury reform should take into account not only the 
jury’s performance in particular cases but also the jury’s unique and crucial 
ability to speak with the community’s voice. 
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